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What constitutes “good” performance in a law enforcement agency, who decides, and how does 
public recognition of that performance change how an agency performs? This study uses a quasi-
experimental design and propensity-score matching model to assess the impact of a law 
enforcement agency’s status as a finalist for the annual Cisco/International Chiefs of Police 
Association (IACP) Community Policing Award on performance in future years, as measured by 
crime clearance rates. It is found that after comparing the treated group (finalist agencies) with 
the untreated group (non-finalist nearest-neighbor agencies), there is no meaningful difference in 
crime clearance rates. This unexpected finding establishes that the public recognition of finalist 
status by the Department of Justice, which promotes finalist agencies as exemplars of best 
practices in community policing, does not impact the subsequent performance of those agencies. 
Additionally, the results of the model suggest that the impact of symbolic politics and social 
construction on the award finalist selection process and the choice by DOJ to promote the 
practices of those agencies should be explored. Questions are also raised as to the utility of crime 
clearance rates as a performance measure, and future avenues for research in each area are 
proposed.  
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Introduction: Performance and Awards in the Public Sector 
 Public administration scholarship has developed frameworks and theories to better 
measure the performance of public agencies (Bozeman & Moulton, 2011; Moynihan, 2008, 
2015; O’Toole & Meier, 2014), as well as to assess the factors that contribute to better 
performance by those organizations (Hvidman & Andersen, 2014; Langbein & Stazyk, 2013; 
Span, Luijkx, Schols, & Schalk, 2011). This scholarship includes work on law enforcement 
agencies and indicates that such measurement is possible, as well as valuable when assessing 
whether law enforcement agencies are meeting their constituents needs (Ammons & Madej, 
2018; Bromberg, Charbonneau, & Smith, 2018; Gorby, 2013; Pasha, 2018; Shane, 2010). 
However, a critical question remains unanswered: how is “good” performance among law 
enforcement agencies recognized publicly, and what is the impact of that recognition? 
 Organizational or individual awards and recognition are often considered under the 
purview of labor economics and related fields. The studies that have been conducted in those 
disciples often use the individual as the unit of analysis. Such studies have proven inconclusive 
about how and where awards matter, whether public or private recognition leads to better worker 
performance, or if high performing individuals lead to higher performing organizations. While it 
is generally agreed upon that the giving of awards improves the performance of individuals, the 
same may or may not be true for organizations, particularly those in the public sector (Gerhards 
& Siemer, 2014; Kosfeld & Neckermann, 2011). Law enforcement organizations, many of which 
measure performance closely and narrowly, are an ideal group to utilize in conducting a study 
within the academic and theoretical bounds of public administration that looks at the impact of 
awards on performance.  
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 Recent relevant research on performance among law enforcement organizations includes 
assessing how representative bureaucracy impacts the implementation of policy, the use of 
binary comparisons to assess trends in performance, the impact of organizational commitment 
and work engagement, and citizen participation in performance measurement (Chand, 2019; 
Guilfoyle, 2015; Ho, 2015; J. Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty, & Li, 2018; van Gelderen & 
Bik, 2016). These are merely a few of the topics discussed within the literature, and it is fair to 
state that the theoretical landscape of performance measurement among law enforcement 
agencies is not only broad, but also ripe for expansion. This study seeks to assess the impact of 
public recognition of a law enforcement agency’s nomination and selection as a finalist for a 
prominent award, which is said to be based in part on performance, on how that agency performs 
after being publicly recognized. 
 There is little consensus on the causal relationship between public sector awards and 
performance, though award programs continue to proliferate in the public sector and multiple 
scholars have called for the study of their relationships to effectiveness and performance (Borins, 
2000; Entwistle & Downe, 2005; Frey, 2007; Rosenblatt, 2011). According to Hartley and 
Downe (2007), to ensure that awards are given to the most effective organizations and programs, 
the award-giving process (or scheme) must be structured in such a way as to encourage large 
numbers of representative applicants, and multiple stakeholders should observe the application 
and selection process. Further, once awards are given, the relative improvement of organizations 
should be measured post-hoc, and organizers of award processes should self-assess and updated 
their processes frequently to ensure the continued relevance of the award (Hartley & Downe, 
2007; Löffler, 2001).  
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  Finally, although there is research in public administration that has addressed 
organizational performance and awards outside of a direct causal relationship, this has primarily 
focused on the factors that lead to improved performance, including leadership, strategic 
planning, benchmarking, and process management among other factors (Kapucu, Volkov, & 
Wang, 2011; Kouzmin, Löffler, Klages, & Korac-Kakabadse, 1999; Wang, 2002). Beyond this, 
there are also a number of other far-ranging literatures related to performance in the public 
sector, including the links between performance and creativity, democratic accountability, and 
gender, among other factors (Meier, Mastracci, & Wilson, 2006; Ospina, Cunill Grau, & 
Zaltsman, 2004; Rangarajan, 2008). However, to this point, public administration has been 
lacking a thoroughly researched and delimited empirical literature that considers the specific 
consequences of an organization receiving an award, and the connection to future performance.  
 Following, a brief literature review provides a working definition of community policing, 
as well as background on the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Office 
of Community Oriented Policing in the Department of Justice (COPS), providing further context 
for the research question. Two theoretical frames that may prove useful for understanding the 
results of the model, symbolic politics and social construction, are also reviewed. Next, an 
examination of the methodology outlines the propensity-score matching model, explaining the 
utility of nearest-neighbor matching and the quasi-experimental nature of the design. The 
findings of the model are then presented and followed by a discussion that explores why 
performance as measured by clearance rates did not rise after the public recognition of award-
finalist agencies. Finally, the conclusion offers several potential avenues for future research, 
including assessing the utility of crime clearance rates as a performance measure, exploring the 
possibility of social construction as a driving force behind law enforcement agency policy, and 
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assessing the role symbolic politics may play in the award nomination and finalist selection 
process.  
 
Community Policing: The Roles of the IACP and COPS 
 What constitutes effective and fair policing in the United States and the promotion of 
those policies falls within the purview of the Department of Justice. While the Department of 
Justice does compile internal reports and promotes best practices developed from within, it also 
turns to outside organizations, including interest groups and professional organizations, to find 
and promote best practices. One such group is the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP), a well-known and established professional organization that boasts the largest 
membership of any organization of police executives, exceeding 20,000 in over 100 different 
countries (Fields, 2007).  
 A primary function of the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services (COPS) is to provide grant funding, including over $12.4 billion in grants and 
aid since 1995, to law enforcement agencies across the country to promote the development of 
community-oriented policing programs and to support existing community policing programs 
(Fields, 2007). Research on the effectiveness of grants from COPS is mixed, though evidence 
suggests they have been effective in lowering crime rates in many municipalities (Zhao, 
Scheider, & Thurman, 2002). As an organization tasked with such a significant amount of 
funding to distribute, it is worth noting that COPS has used the IACP Community Policing 
Award as a direct proxy for Department of Justice-endorsed best practices in community 
policing for decades. In 2007, COPS published a report titled Award-Winning Community 
Policing Strategies (1996-2006), that cited finalist status for the IACP Community Policing 
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Award as their primary marker for determining the effectiveness of community policing 
programs. A letter contained in the report from Carl Peed, Director of COPS, reads in part:  
 
This report offers a brief description of approaches that have been successfully developed 
and implemented at the local level to reduce crime and disorder. We are confident that 
many of the strategic principles documented in the report can be modified as needed and 
adopted by other law enforcement agencies in support of their efforts to develop and 
implement community policing programs that address challenges they may be 
confronting. Moreover, the jurisdictions that implemented the approaches detailed in this 
report should be commended for their innovativeness and commitment to community 
policing.…Congratulations to the Community Policing Award winners and finalists, and 
thank you again for your commitment to fighting crime and disorder through effective 
community policing approaches (Fields, 2007, p. iv). 
 
 The report makes clear that the Department of Justice is confident that finalist status for 
the IACP Community Policing Award is an indicator of best practices in community policing. 
According to the award’s website (IACP, 2018a), departments can self-nominate for this award 
or be nominated by outside entities, with hundreds of nominations submitted each year. The 
process of choosing the finalists is opaque and conducted solely by the members of the IACP 
Community Policing Committee, who are chiefs, superintendents, or command-level police 
officers in public law enforcement agencies (Fields, 2007; IACP, 2018b). Therefore, it is 
difficult to predict what leads to a department being nominated, but it is possible to measure how 
community policing programs fare after being selected as finalists.  
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 In order to substantively engage in such an analysis, it is important to first understand the 
tenets of community policing. According to numerous scholars, community policing is broadly 
defined as the engagement between police leadership, community leadership, and citizens to 
prevent crime (Chappell, MacDonald, & Manz, 2006; Engel & Worden, 2003; Mastrofski, 
Snipes, Parks, & Maxwell, 2000; B. Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2011). The idea of community 
policing dates back to the 1980s, and the efforts of reformers to engage police with communities 
in new and innovate ways. While community policing originated in big cities such as New York 
and Los Angeles, it has spread to urban, suburban, and rural communities since its inception 
(Weisburd & Braga, 2006; Zimring, 2011).  
 Community policing has also expanded to include collaborative service provision and 
how such shared service agreements promote community-focused policing practices (Carrizales, 
Melitski, & Schwester, 2010; Choi & Choi, 2012).  Community policing is not without its critics, 
as more recent work has shown it is often most effective in places where it may not be needed, 
including in urban areas that already have lower crime rates (McCandless, 2018; Rukus, Warner, 
& Zhang, 2018). Scholars have also suggested that community policing serves primarily as a 
promotional tool for police departments, and that actual interactions with citizens are infrequent 
and dismissive (Liederbach, Fritsch, Carter, & Bannister, 2008; Roussell & Gascon, 2014). 
 Despite this criticism, community policing has become an institutionalized best practice, 
defined by several foundational elements. These elements, as characterized by Greene and 
Mastrofski (1988) are laid out below: 
 
[Table 1 here] 
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Measuring Performance in Community Policing 
 Community policing has been studied extensively and across numerous types of 
departments, with performance outcomes measured in the traditional metrics of arrests, crime 
rates, and clearance rates, but also utilizing surveys to understand how citizens and officers 
perceive of the success of a program (Brewster, Stoloff, & Sanders, 2005; Ostrom & Whitaker, 
1974; Willis, Mastrofski, & Kochel, 2010). However, outside of those specific outcomes, others 
have pointed to the ability of community policing to fundamentally shift the role of police, from 
simple crime prevention to providing emergency services, reducing fear, and mobilizing 
communities (Moore, 1994). It is reasonable to assume that community policing is also intended 
to promote the reporting of crimes, as police build up trust and rapport with the communities 
they serve, and as later research has made abundantly clear (Friedmann, 1992; Skogan, 2004; 
Wilson, 2006). Solving crimes is made easier with more frequent reporting of crimes and 
witnesses willing to testify to a crime being committed. Clearly, effective community policing, 
with its intentions of developing these critical partnerships, might also be measured not only by 
crimes committed, but by crimes solved, particularly over an extended period of time.  
 The most often used and widely available metric to determine this is crime clearance 
rates, the ratio of crimes charged (or “solved”) to crimes recorded. This measure has been 
utilized in performance management work on community policing, based on theoretical 
understandings of the goal of community policing programs, including those understandings and 
outcomes proposed by Friedmann (1992); Moore (1994); Skogan (2004) and Wilson (2006). 
While measuring the performance of community policing programs is difficult, particularly if 
success is measured by preventing crime as well as solving it, crime clearance rates are one of 
the factors that can and should be utilized as a measure of performance (Skolnick & Bayley, 
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1988). While the measure is imperfect, this study will utilize is based on the available evidence 
that it is, at the very least, a meaningful indicator of some elements of performance.   
 Crime clearance rates have been seen by some scholars as a controversial measure of 
performance, and there are studies that have shown no relationship or a negative relationship 
between clearance rates and performance indicators, citizen satisfaction and other normatively 
positive outcomes for police departments, suggesting that crime clearance rates may not be a 
useful measurement of police performance (Cook, 1979; Nagin, Solow, & Lum, 2015; Pogarsky 
& Loughran, 2016; Swindell & Kelly, 2000). Beyond this, there are also concerns that crime 
clearance rates measure effectiveness without giving account to democratic values, such as due 
process or equity (Charbonneau & Riccucci, 2008; McCandless, 2018). Since this disagreement 
on the utility of clearance rates as a performance measurement remains a salient debate, a 
secondary goal of this study is to reassess the value of those rates as a meaningful representation 
of performance in community policing programs. 
 Despite these criticisms, there are also scholars including Roberts (2008), Skogan (2004), 
and Litwin (2004) who suggest that crime clearance rates may increase under a well-performing 
community policing regime. While this relationship has yet to be fully explored, this study 
contributes to furthering that discussion by providing evidence of the impact public recognition 
of award finalist status has on crime clearance rates.  If award-finalist programs have built up 
relationships over time with community leaders, developed trust between officers and the 
communities they serve, and created an environment in which citizens are both comfortable and 
satisfied with their police department, crime clearance rates, according to this group of scholars, 
should rise among those award-finalist programs compared to other similar departments without 
award-finalist programs, particularly considering the temporal element of the data.  
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Therefore, if crime clearance rates are a useful measurement of performance, the following 
question arises: Are crime clearance rates in police departments publicly recognized as finalists 
for the IACP Award higher in the years following that recognition as compared to departments 
serving similar populations that were not selected for the award? 
 
Social Construction and Symbolic Politics  
 Community policing falls into the broad category of policing interventions, specific 
methods of policing utilized in a particular place or during a particular time and thereby 
measurable against the control group of a similar place or time lacking that intervention. 
Excellent work has been done on measuring these interventions, and those authors should be 
applauded for advancing the field of police performance measurement through quasi-
experimental and experimental designs and analyses (Braga, 2005; Braga & Bond, 2008; 
Weisburd & Braga, 2006). However, this research considers the impact of public recognition of 
an intervention, and not of the intervention itself – an important distinction. Since this study 
considers how the public recognition of community policing programs and the subsequent 
promotion of those programs as best practices by the Department of Justice impacts 
performance, two specific theoretical frames will be considered when assessing how and why 
this recognition may make a impact, and what it means for the future measurement and study of 
police performance. 
 First, the theory of symbolic politics argues that, throughout the award finalist selection, 
recognition, and promotion process, both the IACP and the Department of Justice will promote 
themselves as organizations that recognize and highlight departments that serve particular 
populations and municipalities with particular characteristics in an attempt to improve their own 
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public image and political standing. Most notably characterized by Edelman (1985), symbolic 
politics is best described as the notion that most large organizations with political interest engage 
in rhetoric and symbolism for political gains and to facilitate certain actions by citizens and 
voting groups. In particular, these organizations and the individuals within them take on social 
roles and representations of certain values, not always with bad intentions but potentially with 
negative consequences. Public officials engaged in symbolic politics tell their constituents or the 
recipients of their services what those citizens want to believe, constantly adapting and 
modifying their own views to match those of citizens (Edelman, 1985; Scheingold, 1974). These 
symbolic politics may play out in any policy area or within any organization, and the conclusions 
drawn in this work make note of the potential for this dynamic to exist within the boundaries of 
the policy areas and law enforcement departments discussed herein.  
 The framework of symbolic politics has been used to understand the relationship between 
groups of people and a wide variety of policies, including policies concerning busing, language, 
and labor (Chun, 2011; Citrin, Reingold, Walters, & Green, 1990; Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 
1979). Perhaps most relevant to this research, symbolic politics has also been used to critique the 
politics of reinventing government, most notably by Fox (1996), who posits that symbolic 
politics can help explain the fascination among public administrators and scholars with the 
reinvention of government as a postmodern exercise in branding as opposed to a commitment to 
meaningful reform. This idea, of a politics of symbolism to the detriment of improved 
performance, is central to the findings presented herein. If the conclusions demonstrated in this 
work are valid, then the possibility of a similar relationship cannot be wholly discounted without 
further research. 
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 Second, it is possible that departments are seen as worthy of promotion and as a good 
choice to be a finalist for this award based in part upon the “deservedness” of the populations 
they serve, as set forward in the literature on social constructions of those populations (Kreitzer 
& Watts Smith, 2018; Schneider, Ingram, & de Leon, 2014). While a comprehensive 
understanding of the factors leading to selection as finalists would require considerably more 
research into that practice and a willingness on the part of the IACP to disclose those processes, 
it possible that the social construction of the served populations of award-finalist departments 
may influence how performance changes post-award, in concurrence with the symbolic politics 
promoted by the awarding institutions.  
 When populations are socially constructed, the policies that serve them are often 
developed to serve certain groups and not others, and the specific impacts of those policies is 
intentionally asymmetrical, with certain groups receiving far more benefit. When considered in 
conjunction with the work on community policing and the evidence that it has been most 
effective in certain communities, there is a compelling case to be made that these phenomena 
may be linked. Public policy can also be framed by policy makers as the result of a “problem” 
caused by citizens, which assigns blame to certain groups and makes explicit the political 
messaging that certain groups are more deserving than others. As these narratives are created, 
those who receive the benefits and burdens of public policy reconstruct their own perceptions of 
citizenship, deservedness, and political power (Mettler & Soss, 2004).   
Social construction has been shown to be a contributing factor to the giving of public 
sector awards and public recognition (Gayles, 2007; Steinacker, 2006). Beyond this, social 
construction is also considered a contributing factor to how governments decide who receives the 
benefits of a policy and how that is perceived by mass publics, a relationship that echoes that of 
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the awarder-awardee (Breznau, 2016; Mettler & SoRelle, 2014; Schneider et al., 2014; Soss & 
Schram, 2007). Therefore, it is reasonable to connect these ideas to the work presented here, as 
the social construction of law enforcement agencies by the IACP and the Department of Justice 
may have a meaningful role to play in understanding how and why departments perform better or 
worse after receiving an award, and what that means for the public recognition of a department 
for best practices in community policing. 
Finally, street-level bureaucrats, such as police officers, are likely to socially construct 
their clients in both implicit and explicit ways. In their professional roles, they construct and act 
within both professional and personal identities. These identities in turn impact how they interact 
with the public and execute the functions of their position. Race, class and gender of the 
bureaucrats and the professional environment in which they serve are particularly salient 
variables, and it is worth nothing that these categories are relatively homogenous within police 
departments in particular (Oberfield, 2011; Prokos & Padavic, 2002; Watkins-Hayes, 2009).  
 
Methodology 
 To answer the question proposed here, the following model assesses award finalists in 
state of California, which had 11 departments named as finalists for the IACP Community 
Policing Award between 2000-2006, more than any other state in the country. Public law 
enforcement agencies in California are frequently utilized to infer conclusions about public 
administration in the United States, including in the areas of interlocal service cooperation, 
municipal contracting, and community policing (Nelligan & Bourns, 2011; Roussell & Gascon, 
2014; Zeemering, 2018). This is in part due to the public availability of data from the state, 
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including crime rates, population served, demographic data, and other information on all police 
departments in the state.  
 The publicly available dataset for this study was obtained from the California Department 
of Justice and spans the years 2007-2014. It contains annual data on crime and demographics for 
every law enforcement agency in California. The data was cleaned to ensure only municipal 
police departments were included. In this case, “municipal police department” is defined by a 
law enforcement agency that serves a specific municipality. Departments that serve exclusively 
colleges, transportation systems, hospitals, parks, school districts, or state agencies were 
excluded, as were sheriff’s departments and state law enforcement agencies, thereby ensuring a 
relevant comparison between units. Within the category of municipal departments, the City of 
Los Angeles Police Department was removed, based upon its outlier status both as department 
serving the second-most populated city in the country and as having been a finalist three times 
for this award, the only multiple-time finalist in the study. This left 10 departments, those of 
Clayton, Fontana, Fremont, Irvine, Irwindale, Los Gatos, Pasadena, Pittsburg, Santa Rosa, and 
Suisun City, to be considered as the treated group in the analysis. 
 A dummy variable was created indicating whether or not a given agency had received 
award finalist status between 2000-2006, and each observation recorded for that agency was 
categorized as such. In total, the number of observations (one per year per municipal department, 
2007-2014) resulted in n=3,193. While a single state is an imperfect indicator for how a 
particular policy might be implemented or measured nationally, the way that state policies are 
framed, communicated and implemented can be helpful in understanding national trends (Bailey 
& Rom, 2004; Cann & Wilhelm, 2011; Caughey & Warshaw, 2016; Jeon & Haider‐Markel, 
2001).  
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 It should be noted that this study utilizes data collected post-award (2007-2014) to 
determine the performance outcomes of the departments that received award finalist status 
between 2000-2006. While this means that the conclusions herein cannot be considered 
predictive, they do provide important context in determining the value of the award, the ways in 
which police department change or adapt based upon obtaining this Department of Justice seal of 
approval, how police officers might change their behavior or practices based upon that status, 
and, perhaps most importantly, determining whether or not these best practices being put forward 
by the Department of Justice reflect programs that have continued to achieve positive outcomes 
since receiving award finalist status.  
 To understand the relevant indicators of performance post-award, a propensity score 
match is conducted, controlling for the variables of interest indicated in the table below and their 
relationship to crime clearance rates. Propensity score matching, a methodology originating in 
and most often practiced in the health sciences, is an effective method to measure the impact of 
given treatment, in this case community policing, on a given subject, in this case the jurisdiction 
policed by the departments considered here. In particular, the propensity score model can 
accurately compare treated and untreated units in relevant pairs, which is useful when 
attempting to compare agencies in the most populated state in the United States. Without 
matching agencies for comparison, the results would be thrown off by comparing agencies 
whose size, demographics, socioeconomics, and other characteristics vastly differ from each 
other to the point of making a comparison invalid.  
The variables below are selected based upon their usage as variables of interests in 
multiple studies by the authors in Table 1, as well as their use as standard variables in the fields 
of both criminal justice and public administration. The county variable clarifies the departments 
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regionally and jurisdictionally, helping to ensure a consistent match among similar agencies. The 
various crime and arrested-related variables measure the specific type, level and manner of 
crimes and arrests each department deals with, which eliminates the inadvertent matching of 
agencies who are similar in population and demographics served but not in criminal behavior 
observed and available police resources. Finally, the racial indicator variables and population 
served variable help to define the agencies demographically based on the populations they serve, 
which is critical to matching accurately and to understanding how social construction and 
symbolic politics may contribute to the conclusions of this research. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 Propensity score matching was chosen as a methodology because of its unique ability to 
detect differences between treated and untreated groups. While a difference-in-differences 
estimator would be another possibility for analyzing this data, propensity score matching is 
helpful in eliminating extreme outliers, of which there are many within this dataset. While the 
method has been criticized for being susceptible to omissions within observations of the 
dependent variable (clearance rates), the benefit of matching like departments and avoiding the 
comparison of the San Diego or San Francisco police departments with small, rural California 
departments outweighs these concerns. By utilizing this method, there can be confidence that the 
broader question will be answered accurately and without the interference of extreme outliers, 
which for the purposes of this study is more important than exact clearance rates and p-values. 
Propensity score matching has also been shown to be an accurate measurement even among 
treatment groups with a small n of treated units. Although it suffers from the same drawbacks as 
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other quantitative methodologies when it comes to analyzing small n data, it has also been shown 
to be relatively effective in mitigating some of those drawbacks, including when tested against 
difference-in-difference estimators (Austin, 2009a, 2009b; Hajage, Tubach, Steg, Bhatt, & De 
Rycke, 2016; O’Neill, Kreif, Grieve, Sutton, & Sekhon, 2016)1.  
Propensity score matching compares how policy outcomes differ for units that received a 
particular treatment, and compare them to observationally similar units that did not (Heinrich, 
2010). The propensity score matching model conducted here uses nearest-neighbor matching 
with replacement, which matches each treated unit with its five closest neighbors, according to 
their calculated propensity scores. Untreated units can be utilized as matches for multiple treated 
units, and the propensity score is based on similarities in reported observations for the given 
variables (Heinrich, 2010). The estimator for propensity scores, or the average treatment effect 











where NT is the number of treated units, I1 is the set of treated units, I0 is the set of untreated 
units, Sp is the common support and ωij is the weight allocated to a given single unit based on its 
propensity score (Heinrich, 2010).  
 
                                                 
1 While a difference-in-difference estimator was considered as a methodological alternative, the 
functionality of that model relies on data that covers both pre- and post-treatment periods, and is intended 
to gauge the change over time of a given variable across a group of units See: Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004); Abadie (2005); Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). Since this research is intended to 
measure the relationship between an agency receiving a prestigious award and future performance as 
compared to similar agencies, and not on the performance of a given agency before and after receiving an 




[Figure 1 here] 
 
 Figure 1 shows the density of the propensity scores for California departments before and 
after matching using a normal density function. Since the distribution between the treated and 
control groups is better correlated after matching, we can assume that propensity score matching 
will be a useful way to determine the value of the treatment (Heinrich, 2010). While the before-
matching graph shows a clear gap between propensity scores, the after-matching graph shows a 
more correlated relationship between the treated (award-finalist) departments and their five 
closest neighbors based on the variables included in the propensity score matching models 
below. Such a relationship demonstrates that matching in this way should provide more accurate 
insight into how award-nominated departments perform compared to other similar departments.  
   
[Table 3 here] 
 
  As per the table above, there is no significant difference between treated and untreated 
departments when it comes to violent crime clearance rates. While there is a significant 
difference at the .01 level between treated and untreated departments for property crime 
clearance rates, the sign of the coefficient is negative, indicating that departments with award-
finalist community policing programs have lower property crime clearance rates than their five 
nearest-neighbors according to the model. This would indicate that by this measure, award-
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nominated departments are not more successful in achieving a specific and measurable goal of 
community policing: solving crimes.  
 Finally, the low pseudo r-squared, 0.1428, suggests that there is more than meets the eye 
when it comes how finalist status impacts performance post-hoc. If finalist status was a good 
indicator of improved performance, we would expect the pseudo r-squared to reflect a model that 
captured a larger percentage of the relevant factors contributing to that improved performance. 
However, the low result supports the conclusion that even in a robust model that considers the 
traditional characteristics and variables used to measure community policing effectiveness, the 
full story cannot be told through this data alone. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 The results of this study constitute an effort to contribute to the ongoing discussion about 
efficacy and effectiveness in policing interventions and their ability to reduce crime (Pasha, 
2018; Pollack, 2017; Saunders, Robbins, & Ober, 2017). The first and most important 
contribution to this literature reached herein is that, according to a propensity score model using 
crime clearance rates as an indicator of performance, there is no evidence to suggest that police 
departments who were finalists for the IACP Community Policing Award have better crime 
clearance rates in the years following their selection than similar departments who were not 
finalists. This result suggests that when the Department of Justice complies a report on best 
practices for community policing using prior award finalists, they are not conducting any 
investigation into the crime clearance rates of those departments in the years following being 
selected as a finalist; or, the Department of Justice does not consider crime clearance rates a 
meaningful statistic and utilizes another measurement to assess performance. This leads to an 
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important question for scholars: if departments are not being put forward by the Department of 
Justice as examples of best practice based on their ability to raise crime clearance rates in their 
community, what metrics are being considered? It would appear from the COPS Office report 
(Fields, 2007) that the only consideration is whether or not a department was a finalist for the 
IACP Community Policing Award.  
 If not performance, then what might be driving the selection of these departments as 
examples of “best practices” in community policing? While it is possible that the factors that 
determine finalist status are solely based in the organizational characteristics of departments 
themselves, and therefore unrelated to the demographics and other contextual factors of the 
population served by the department, it seem unlikely that the particulars of the population 
served by the department would have no impact on whether or not they obtained award finalist 
status or on performance thereafter. Therefore, this result presents a number of questions about 
how departments are chosen as finalists, and if perhaps there are structural and systemic forces 
are involved. 
 While the Department of Justice continues to rubber-stamp the recommendations of the 
IACP with regards to community policing best practices, it should be of pressing concern to 
scholars of criminal justice policy and policing to consider whether or not this process is 
accurately capturing the success or failure of community policing programs. Particularly in the 
contemporary policing context, with trust in police at very low levels and evidence to suggest 
that police stereotype and over-police certain communities, it is of utmost importance that the 
policies that constitute best practices in community policing be reexamined to determine if they 
are in fact the best way to move policing in a progressive and citizen-focused direction (Harrits, 
2018; Soss & Weaver, 2017; R. B. Taylor & Lawton, 2012). 
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 To better understand these results, the discussion of them must be situated within the 
broader conversation around the impact of social construction on criminal justice policy. 
Scholars are aware of the explanatory power that this theoretical frame can bring to criminal 
justice policy, demonstrating how inmates are social constructed in such a way as to limit their 
access to health care (J. Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson‐Crotty, 2004), the impact of racial 
attitudes on prisoners reentry policy (Percival, 2009), how public opinion can help shape 
numerous types of punitive criminal laws and policies (Enns, 2014; S. Nicholson-Crotty, 
Peterson, & Ramirez, 2009; Owens & Smith, 2012), and perhaps most importantly, how the 
social construction of racial groups is a crucial factor in understanding how policy is designed 
and carried out in different ways for different populations (Cingranelli, 1981; Schneider et al., 
2014; Sharp, 2014; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011; Weaver & Lerman, 2010). 
 Further, public interest groups such as the IACP have the ability to obtain power and 
influence in the policy formulation process, including those who are organized and funded by 
collaboration with other interest groups or by the nature of the group including large populations 
of engaged citizens (Campbell, 2003). However, this is rarely the case for prisoners, low-income 
citizens, minorities, or others who are likely to be policed or subject to the carceral face of the 
state (Soss & Weaver, 2017). Governments are in control of who they deem legitimate citizens, 
and that is often mitigated or propagated by the socially constructed identities of a given 
population. This effect is magnified when it comes to minority communities, particularly low-
income or black communities (Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 2008; Soss, Fording, & 
Schram, 2008). 
 The formulation and implementation of policy is crucial to defining citizenship, status 
and political engagement for individuals. When the design and implementation of a policy is 
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such that it leaves citizens who engage with it feeling negatively about the government, that 
perception will carry over to how they conceive of themselves in relationship to the state. For 
example, recipients of food stamps are often treated differently from those receiving social 
security, resulting in vastly different perceptions of citizenship and substantially different 
characterizations of citizen’s relationships to the state (Campbell, 2003; Mettler & Soss, 2004). 
These same policies are formulated in such a way as to provide certain benefits to certain groups, 
while generating costs for others. This results in a policy whose impact recipients perceive in one 
way, and government officials and citizens who are not impacted by the policy perceive entirely 
differently (Jordan & Matt, 2014; Mettler & SoRelle, 2014; Soss, 1999). 
 If the social construction of populations is relevant to the lack of significant difference in 
crime clearance rates among finalist and non-finalist departments, it holds implications for the 
study of public management and performance management, particularly concerning law 
enforcement agencies. In particular, it suggests indicate that scholars must pay closer attention to 
contextual factors as suggested by Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda (2017), as well as to how 
policing is carried out in different social and institutional contexts (Leon-Moreta, 2018). Further, 
it will require scholars of public agency performance to closely reexamine how performance is 
conceptualized and measured to ensure that the social construction of populations is included in 
their analysis. To move the conversation around the impact of social construction on 
performance forward, more work must be done to understand the selection process for public 
sector awards, particularly those that are held up as paragons of best practice for departments 
around the country.  
 The symbolic politics potentially practiced by both the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police and the Department of Justice are worthy of discussion here as well. There is no 
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reason to doubt that the largest law enforcement body in the country, along with the largest 
professional association of law enforcement leadership, might want to promote their agendas in 
the most effective way possible. This could mean forgoing performance measurement as a 
standard for selecting award nominees and finalists in favor of an approach that rewards the 
departments they believe will best serve as exemplars of community policing in the public eye. 
While acting on the impulses of symbolic politics may be a well-intentioned push by an 
organization to promote certain values, and overreliance on such a strategy, particularly when it 
comes to promoting a policing intervention, risks promoting ineffective or deleterious practices 
(Edelman, 1985; Roussell & Gascon, 2014).   
 
Future Avenues for Research  
 As referenced earlier, there are several substantive debates about how community 
policing is and should be studied, particularly when it comes to measuring performance, the 
relationship between normatively “good” performance and social equity, and overall viability 
and utility of community policing as an intervention (McCandless, 2018; Roussell & Gascon, 
2014; Rukus et al., 2018; Willis et al., 2010). This study provides insight into how public 
recognition and awards fit into this larger debate, and suggests that such accolades, while 
perhaps useful in other ways, are not likely to improve the performance of an agency that 
receives them. This finding, in turn, leads to questions about how award finalists and nominees 
are chosen, the process by which the Department of Justice decides to promote their programs as 
best practices, and the resulting impact on future award recipients and their performance.  
 Indeed, the proposition that symbolic politics and social construction play a role in these 
processes suggests that there are real concerns about social equity in community policing 
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practices. Social equity is touted as a pillar of public administration, and the actions of street-
level bureaucrats, including police, are often noted as an administrative area in which more work 
is needed to meet this standard (Frederickson, 1990; Svara & Brunet, 2005). Charbonneau and 
Riccucci (2008) provide an excellent overview of the literature on social equity in policing with 
regard to interventions and citizen perceptions, and Dunn (2009) measures racial disparities in 
traffic ticketing. However, a rigorous review of community policing that considers these 
elements is long overdue and should focus on whether or not community policing programs are 
accomplishing their goals, many of which are often tied directly to issues of social equity. 
 Additionally, scholars must continue reassess crime clearance rates and their utility as a 
measure of community policing performance. This is tied directly to the research on social equity 
in policing, as crime clearance rates do not consider wrongful convictions, nor the enormous 
racial disparities in conviction and sentencing rates across the United States. While crime 
clearance rates are considered, to this point, a valid measure for performance in community 
policing, it is worth considering how those rates are calculated and how racial disparities in the 
justice system may be shaping these and other statistics. Further, the carceral nature of modern 
policing, particularly as it impacts low-income and minority communities, is unlikely to be 
shifted simply based on a single intervention such as community policing, and this should also be 
recognized when measuring performance (Bostaph, 2007; Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-
Markel, 2014; Soss & Weaver, 2017).  
 Finally, future work on community policing must more fully grapple with the idea of 
race-class-subjugated communities, and the role that policing practices play in shaping and 
promoting certain interests over others within them (Soss & Weaver, 2017; Stuart, 2016). 
Community policing belongs in the larger conversation around the carceral state in criminal 
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justice policy, and how communities themselves play important roles in the mitigation or 
liberation of that state (Beckett & Murakawa, 2012; Weaver & Lerman, 2010). This will require 
more rigorous analysis of race, class, and gender as important variables within the performance 
of community policing programs, along with the reassessment of traditional performance 
measures and standards. This work, while difficult, is necessary to move research on 
performance in policing into the next phase of scholarly discourse.  
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Table 1: Defining Elements of a Community Policing Program 
Function Order maintenance, problem solving, developing 
partnerships with communities. 
 
Organizational Design Pushing decisions to the street-level, creating 




Permanent beat assignments, regular meetings, 
assigned caseloads 
 
Demand Relying on citizen feedback, treating citizens as 
consumers of a service 
 
Tactics Foot patrols, counseling, community meetings 
 
Outcomes Satisfaction, crime control, quality of life 































Table 2: Variables 
Year The year in which an observation was recorded. 
 
County The county in which a given department is located. 
 
Violent Crimes The number of violent crimes committed in a given year within 
the jurisdiction of a given department.  
 
Property Crimes The number of crimes against property committed in a given year 
within the jurisdiction of a given department.  
 
Felony Arrests The number of felony arrests in a given year within the 
jurisdiction of a given department.  
 
Misdemeanor Arrests The number of misdemeanor arrests in a given year within the 




The percentage of self-identified Black citizens within the 




The percentage of self-identified Hispanic citizens within the 




The percentage of self-identified Asian/Pacific Islander citizens 




The percentage of citizens who self-identity their race as “other” 
within the jurisdiction of a given department in a given year. 
 
Population Served The total number of citizens served by a given department in a 
given year.  
 
Violent Crime 
Clearance Rate  
Rate of violent crimes cleared by a given department in a given 
year. A cleared offense is when at least one person involved has 
been arrested and charged.  
 
Property Crime 
Clearance Rate  
Rate of property crimes cleared by a given department in a given 
year. A cleared offense is when at least one person involved has 









Table 3: Propensity Score Matching 
 
 




Clearance Rate  
Treated 2.19 -4.23***  
(2.0860) (1.2411)    
Constants 50.87*** 16.96***  
(0.3502) (0.2084)    
N = 3193.00 
  
F = 1.11 
Pseudo r2 = 0.1428 
  
  (Standard errors in parentheses) 




Fig. 1: Propensity Score Distributions Before and After Nearest-Neighbor Matching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
